Carriers in port at pearl harbor page 3 alternate history discussion gasco abu dhabi salary


I would also point out that the U.S. had, by the end of 1943 well over 350 modern (1934 or later) destroyers and destroyer escorts in commission, with more coming off the ways literally every other day, which was more than sufficient to blanket the North Atlantic and support the Pacific. The IJN, on the other hand, never had more than 60 modern destroyers in commission at any time in the war

Hell, I’ll even give the IJN the extra four decks. That leaves them out numbered in decks by 2-1 and in aircraft by slightly more than 2 to 1. It also leaves the U.S. with the same qualitative advantage in the actual aircraft involved. If anything, a more successful first year mean the Japanese are more likely to continue with their current designs and with electricity vs magnetism venn diagram their original pilot training system that only graduated a maximum of 650 men a year.

I would also point out, that even in the early days of the war, when the USN was operating the less capable F4F-3 and F4F-4, the American pilots had a 3-1 advantage in air-to-air engagements (see Lindstrom’s First Team, Parshall’s Shattered Sword, and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, as just a start of resources). In mid 1944, they will not be flying F4F’s, but the far superior F6F, which was initially ordered in mid-1941 and had its first flight with the R-2800 engine in July of 1942.

I see the majority here sees things the way it would be the US way, with no alternate opposition, which is doing the OTL thing. This is far from realistic, so the USN would act more or less following the OTL as well, since there still would be FDR to deal with and the Germany First Doctrine. The USA still needed time to built up strength for the counter offensive and this was secondary to the War in Europe anyway, or there would be a very difficult grade 6 electricity project ideas political issue to deal with as well, with both the UK and USSR. Japan electricity prices going up had to wait, no matter what happened in the Pacific.

To look at things the Japanese way, the loss of the US Pacific Fleet as a fighting unit, including the loss of the two carriers at Pearl, would result in a more or less planed expansion of the fleet, including the construction of the new carriers of both Tayho and Unryu classes and less attention to ASW escorts, since the threath would be felt much later only, when the USN torpedoproblem would be solved. SO the planning of the Tahyho and its three slightly modified sisterships, as well as all six Unryu’s, originally not intended for fleetbattles, but inevitably grouped with the battlefleet most likly, there would be at least four new large carriers ready in halfway 1944, unless there was some disaster.

These four were present in the OTL, but lacked aircraft in the case of the Unryu’s, although the vessels were operational , more or less. an alternate line would shift attention fronm teh damagerepair of battledamaged ships to new construction and a slight increase in speed of construction would allow the IJN to have ten large carriers in hald 1944, besides some five lighweight ones and three large converted ones (Hiyo, Junyo and Shinano), all assuming none had been lost already.

In the same period, the USN would posses most likly the three surviving [prewar carriers, (Saratoga, Yorktown and Hornet) assuming non was already lost as well). Wasp would be questionable, but can be allocated as well to the Pacific. The first six Essex Class Carriers would be fully worked up and operational as well and all nine Independence class ships too, giving the USN in numbers paritywith Japan. Both posses some chapter 7 electricity and magnetism ten large fast carriers, and some nine lighter, or converted ones. The only difference would be in CVE’s as the USA was already turning them out in great numbers. (All assumption on the base no further losses had occured.) Perhaps the USN could have abbandoned the Iowa clas and converted them into fast carriers as well, but most likely these would not be ready before late 1945.

Atternately ag gaston birmingham 120, the help of the Germans in the war should not be underestimated as well. The U-Boote were still prowling the Atlantic and could theoretically disrupt shipping on the East coast seriously, preventint the USN to allocate vast numbers of supportvessels to the pacific to support the Carriers and invasionfleets. Especially ASW vessels would be hold back in the Atlantic, which would result in less destroyers in the Pacific to support the fleet. A lucky hit on a new carrier, transfering from Atlantic to Pacific was also a possibility.

In the most likely scenario, the two carriers, when at Pearl during the attack, get most attention and are likely CTL, as their hullintegrety is lesser than that of a battleships, while also being vulnerable to secondary fires, because of their AVGAS storages. When combatting very large fires on a carrier, something like USS Franklin Experienced, lots of water is pumped in for the firefighting, causing topheaviness and risk of capsizing. Historically, carriers hit in port tend to capsize in most cases (OTL Amagi, Aqualia.)

Assuming Japan augmented its prodiction to the new situation in the war and also acted tactically more in line with the new situation, it still seems debatable whether the arkansas gas association USN in the Pacific could hold its own in 1942. Until the new breed came along in serious numbers and there would be no further losses for both, it would be halfway 1944, untill parity was achieved at sea with the IJN.

Japan could boost production of carriers, such as the already laid Tayho, by dropping the batlteship construction, as well as the refitting and rebuilding of ships in the Shadow program from Pearl Harbor on, most dominantly the conversion of the Seaplane carriers Chitose and Chyoda. Only those ships already started, such as the Hiyo and Junyo, would be completed. Building of Shinano and Nr.111 would be stopped, while Shinano would either be dismantled, or converted as historically. Tayho and her electricity storage cost per kwh planned sisters would be laid down, replacing the canceled battleships, while the Unryu class would also be started as historically, taking material from the canceled conversion of the Ise class battleships and the scrapped Ibuki class cruiser. If no other urgent needs arose, the IJN could continue to produce steadily and have the flattops ready by half 1944, as suggested before.

After the destruction of Pearl Harbor as a base, the IJN coud roam free in the Pacific. It only needed to divert its attention during the actual attack from the ships, to the base installations and fueldepots, while the possible damage the AVGAS laden USS Neosho could do, could boost the damage as well. With Pearl Harbor closed for a crucial number of months, the Japanese could manouvre themselves into a good possition to prepare for the expected counterattack, if such a thing would still come, much later. Diplomates would likely seek out a more peacefull sollution gasbuddy nj, depending on the US Politicians, wether or not they could go in with. In the end, it is money that counts, so i it is not completely out of the question.

Quite often a lot of the AV gas would be unloaded while in port as regards the Carriers. Though that would depend on whether they were on alert or not. And our carriers had the avgas tanks deep inside the hull, less likely to rupture. The Lex had the avgas leak due to what is believed to be a freak occurance at Coral Sea, and then the idiot control flunkie decided to open the vents and spread it all over. Had that not happened the explosion would have been much less damaging and there is every chance she would have been saved. Counter flooding saved the West Virginia from capsizing; there is no reason to think that the carriers would not have been able to do the same. Oklahoma got hit and was apparently almost as unbuttoned as the California mp electricity bill payment paschim kshetra was (which also did not capsize due to counter flooding). Its more of a case that the Oklahoma was the exception rather then the rule. So capsizing was less likely then thought (the Japanese ships were in bad shape and barely occupied at the time they were hit in port). Overall Its quite likely the carriers would have been raised if they had been sunk. And they would not have needed to go to the West Coast for refitting.

IF after the incredible success of the first 6 months was not enough to make the IJN drop battleships and concentrate on carriers, what makes you think anything would? Your rational for thinking so is full of holes. There is no reason that the IJN would have gotten any more carriers any faster then the OTL. As has been mentioned the IJN shipyards were extremely slow and ineffecient.