Hong kong land law blog land law cases in hong kong and other common law jurisdictions gas density and molar mass

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C agreed to instruct SHL’s solicitors to act for him in the purchase. A conveyancing clerk, L, handled the transaction. gaston yla agrupacion santa fe The plan attached to the sale and purchase agreement did not show an open kitchen. L assured C that SHL would change the kitchen to an open kitchen layout. The assignment, like the agreement, showed a closed kitchen layout.

On the other hand, the 2009 side letter conveyed the impression that the flat could have an open kitchen layout ([87]). SHL approved its terms ([89]). W’s statements were representations that the flat would have an open kitchen layout. natural gas jokes The fact that her employers were the sole sales agents of SHL was relevant ([96] – [97]). While W may have exceeded her actual authority in some of the statements she made, she was acting within the scope of her ostensible authority ([100] – [101]). L was acting within the scope of his authority when he made the relevant representations to C.

Joytex was not entitled to damages for the alleged loss of profit from an alternative investment. This required the plaintiff, ‘to show on a balance of probabilities that it would have entered into the alternative and more profitable transaction, and a real and substantial chance (as opposed to a speculative one) that the relevant third party would have transacted.’ ([151]). Joytex was unable to meet this requirement; there was no evidence to show that it viewed any other property or that it would have retained such a property had it done so ([160]).

This was the question considered by the UK Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd ([2013] UKSC 34). o goshi It is of considerable practical importance to B, especially where much of A’s wealth is tied up in the company. It is true that the court could order A to transfer the shares in the company to B but, as Lord Sumption observed, ‘ this will not always be possible, particularly in cases like this one where the shareholder and the company are both resident abroad in places which may not give direct effect to the orders of the English court.’ ([40]).

In Prest, there were several properties which A had either transferred to a company controlled by him for no consideration or where A had supplied the company with the funds to make the purchase and there was no evidence that this was by way of loan or in return for shares in the company. gas pedal lyrics Thus, on general equitable principles, the company held the properties on trust for A. A could be, and was, ordered to exercise his control over the company to procure the transfer of the legal title to the properties to B.

‘Whether assets legally vested in a company are beneficially owned by its controller is a highly fact-specific issue. It is not possible to give general guidance going beyond the ordinary principles and presumptions of equity, especially those relating to gifts and resulting trusts. But I venture to suggest, however tentatively, that in the case of the matrimonial home, the facts are quite likely to justify the inference that the property was held on trust for a spouse who owned and controlled the company. In many, perhaps most cases, the occupation of the company’s property as the matrimonial home of its controller will not be easily justified in the company’s interest, especially if it is gratuitous. electricity notes class 10 pdf The intention will normally be that the spouse in control of the company intends to retain a degree of control over the matrimonial home which is not consistent with the company’s beneficial ownership. Of course, structures can be devised which give a different impression, and some of them will be entirely genuine. But where, say, the terms of acquisition and occupation of the matrimonial home are arranged between the husband in his personal capacity and the husband in his capacity as the sole effective agent of the company (or someone else acting at his direction), judges exercising family jurisdiction are entitled to be sceptical about whether the terms of occupation are really what they are said to be, or are simply a sham to conceal the reality of the husband’s beneficial ownership’ ([52] emphasis added).

Similarly, Lady Hale said that the power in section 6 MPPO ‘is a very specific statutory power to order one spouse to transfer property to which he is legally entitled to the other spouse. The argument is that that is a power which can, because the husband owns and controls these companies, be exercised against the companies themselves. e85 gas stations in iowa I find it difficult to understand how that can be done unless the company is a mere nominee holding the property on trust for the husband, as we have found to be the case with the properties in issue here. I would be surprised if that were not often the case ([93] emphasis added).

‘I conclude that there is a limited principle of English law which applies when a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control. The court may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the advantage that they would otherwise have obtained by the company’s separate legal personality ([35]).

A building scheme (such as the scheme embodied in a Deed of Mutual Covenant) creates a local law for the estate it governs. The scheme may require owners of property within the scheme to obtain the consent of a common landlord (in a scheme established for leasehold properties) or of some other body (such as a Management Committee) before making alterations or additions to the property. This arrangement envisages the formal submission of plans as the start of a process leading to consent or refusal to give consent. Carrying work out without the requisite consent is a breach of covenant and can lead to an action for a declaration, damages and the grant of an injunction.

What if an owner makes alterations to property without obtaining the formal consent required but either: (a) the person or body with the capacity to give the consent knew of the work and failed to object to it; or (b) the person or body with the capacity to give consent has repeatedly failed to enforce the restriction with regard to alterations made to other properties within the scheme? Would it be inequitable either to allow the enforcement of the covenant or, if it is enforceable, to grant an injunction requiring the property to be reinstated?

Mrs. gasbuddy Singh owned a house in the Rainbow Court estate. She held the property under a lease for 199 years. The lease contained a recital to the effect that all of the units in Rainbow Court would be sold under a building scheme under which the covenants would be mutually enforceable. Rainbow Court Townhouses Ltd (‘the company’) was a company formed for the purpose of managing the development.

Mrs. Singh argued that the landlord and the company had acquiesced in the breach of covenant since: (a) (through its officers and employees) it knew of the work that was to be carried out for several days before it began and had not objected; and (b) the owners of ten other properties within the building scheme had carried out unauthorised alterations to their properties and neither the landlord nor the company had done anything to enforce the covenant against them.

‘It is in all cases a question of degree. It is in many ways analogous to the doctrine of estoppel, and I think it is a fair test to treat it in that way and ask, “Have the plaintiffs by their acts and omissions represented to the defendant that the covenants are no longer enforceable and that he is therefore entitled to use his house as a guest house.’

‘On the face of the pleadings there was an arguable case that these were no different in kind to works which had been accepted without objection on other properties. Whether or not this gave rise to a case of waiver in the sense defined by Farwell J, they were at least arguably relevant to the scope of any mandatory order. It is difficult to see how fairness … would be served by an order which required the Appellant to carry out such works without any investigation of their significance, or how they compared to works accepted without objection on other properties on the estate.’ ([35])

In Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchanges Ltd ([2018] UKSC 24) the UK Supreme Court had to consider the effectiveness of a No Oral Modification (‘NOM’) clause (see here for Part 1 of the blog post about this case setting out the facts and the decision). electricity nw This post considers the underlying principles that the judgments had to confront.

Nevertheless, Lord Sumption (and the majority of the Supreme Court) thought that the NOM clause was effective and that the subsequent oral modification was of no effect: ‘Party autonomy operates up to the point when the contract is made, but thereafter only to the extent that the contract allows … The real offence against party autonomy is the suggestion that they cannot bind themselves as to the form of any variation, even if that is what they have agreed.’ ([11])

‘the scope of estoppel cannot be so broad as to destroy the whole advantage of certainty for which the parties stipulated when they agreed upon terms including the No Oral Modification clause. At the very least, (i) there would have to be some words or conduct unequivocally representing that the variation was valid notwithstanding its informality; and (ii) something more would be required for this purpose than the informal promise itself: see Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering In Gl En SpA’ ([2003] 2 AC 51′ ([16]).

Lord Briggs took a different line on the first of the two questions. He thought that it was conceptually impossible for the parties to impose a formalities requirement on themselves, ‘not to be free, by unanimous further agreement, to vary or abandon [the contract] by any method, whether writing, spoken words or conduct, permitted by the general law’ ([26]).

On the other hand, turning to the second question, Lord Briggs was of the view that ‘an agreed departure [from the NOM clause] will not lightly be inferred, where the parties merely conduct themselves in a non-compliant manner’ ([27]). So normally, as in the present case, the approach of the majority and that of Lord Briggs would lead to the same conclusion.