Howto – define a dmarc record electricity flow diagram

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Optionally requests the receiver to send a feedback report (defined by the Abuse Report Format – RFC 5965 or the Incident Object Description Exchange Format – RFC 5070) which allows the mail sender to monitor and change its policies based on receiver feedback. Both individual and aggregate report formats are allowed. This capability is uniquely triggered by the DMARC RR.

DMARC can be viewed as a meta RR that describes the sender’s email policy, comprising DKIM or SPF electricity generation in usa or both, for any domain. While the draft RFC does not explicitly say anything about the ADSP feature of DKIM it does go out of its way to identify ADSP shortcomings. On balance it would probably be confusing, if not a serious mistake, to have both ADSP and DMARC RRs for any domain.

DMARC uses the universally supported TXT RR with a specially formatted text field containing the application specific data (or DMARC data). This approach removes the need for upgrades to DNS software and is used both by SPF and DKIM. While use of the TXT RR is a pragmatic approach many in the DNS community find such overloading of the TXT RR evil incarnate, however, equally many disapprove of RR proliferation. Sigh.

The value of domain.name is based on both what the specification calls an Organisational Name and a left-most name depth algorithm. The organizational name is derived by the Receiving Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) from a table called a public suffix list which essentialy defines, for any tld, how many labels would be present in a registered (or organizational) domain name, for instance, for .com this would be the first label to the left gas zone of .com and for .uk this would be next two labels to the left of .uk. The draft RFC does not define a central authority for this public suffix list but does point to a list maintained by Mozilla and used by a number of different applications.

Optional. If not present the p= policy is assumed to cover the domain.name and all its subdomains. If sp= is present it indicates the defined policy that applies to subdomains of the domain.name at which the DMARC RR was discovered and not the name itself (the domain.name in this case is covered by the p= tag=value pair). Thus, if the following DMARC RR is present:

Optional (if omitted defaults to adkim=r). In strict mode the sender domain name must exactly match the corresponding d=name (in the DKIM mail headers). In relaxed mode any subdomain of d=domain (in the mail headers) will also be accepted. Thus if d=example.com in the mail header then mail from user@example.com will pass from either adkim = r or adkim=s, however, mail from user@a.example.com will fail if adkim=s but pass if adkim=r.

Optional. Defines the percentage of mail to which the DMARC policy applies. If omitted defaults to pct=100 (100%) – all mail is subject to DMARC processing. This parameter allows mail senders to experiment with a small percentage of mail being subject to DMARC action. Problems can be progressively eliminated from the system before turning DMARC on for all mail.

Generate report to the sending MTA gas bijoux soho if all underlying checks failed. Thus, if only DKIM is used to secure mail and the DKIM check fails a report will be sent, if only SPF is used to secure mail and the SPF check fails a report will be sent. However, if both DKIM and SPF are used and, say, the SPF check fails but the DKIM check passes a report WILL NOT be sent.

Generate report to the sending MTA if any underlying check failed. Thus, if only DKIM is used to secure mail and the DKIM check fails a report will be sent, if only SPF is used to secure mail and the SPF check fails a report will be sent. However, if both DKIM and SPF are used and, say, the SPF check fails but the DKIM check passes a report WILL be sent.

Optional. If not present aggregate reports will not be sent from the receiving MTA. URIs must be of the format mailto:user@example.com (implicit in the draft RFC). Aggregate report format is defined in section 7.2 of the draft RFC. Where a mailto address is lies with the sending electricity review worksheet zone no additional configuration is required, however if the mailto address lies outside the sending zone an additional empty DMRC RR is required. Thus, if the email sending zone is example.net and the DMARC TXT RR contains the parameter rua=mailto:dmarc-admin@example.net this lies inside the sending zone and no additional configuration is required. If, however the email sending zone is example.net and the DMARC TXT RR in the zone file for example.net contains the parameter rua=mailto:dmarc-admin@example.com this lies outside the sending zone and the zone example.com must validate that it will accept reports for the example.net domain by having the following minimal DMARC TXT RR:

Optional. If not present detailed failure reports will not be sent from the receiving MTA. URIs must be of the format mailto:user@example.com (implicit in the draft RFC). Where a mailto address is lies with the sending zone no additional configuration is required, however if the mailto address lies outside the sending zone an additional empty DMRC RR is required. Thus, if the email sending zone is example.net and the DMARC TXT RR contains the parameter rua=mailto:dmarc-admin@example.net this lies inside the sending zone and no additional configuration is required. If, however the email sending zone is example.net and the DMARC TXT RR in the zone file for example.net contains u gas hampton the parameter rua=mailto:dmarc-admin@example.com this lies outside the sending zone and the zone example.com must validate that it will accept reports for the example.net domain by having the following minimal DMARC TXT RR:

This is an aggressive policy and should only be adopted where the sender is certain that both DKIM and SPF are correctly configured. Not for the faint-hearted. Assume the domain example.net only sends mail in the form user@example.net (mail is not sent from any subdomain) and that both DKIM and SPF are used in relaxed format. The domain owner wishes to have a daily aggregate report from mail receivers (in Abuse Report format – RFC 5965) of any problems at the address dmarc-admin@example.com if either SPF or DKIM fails, suggests that mail failing any checks should be rejected and that 100% of mail should be checked. The following addition to example.net’s zone file implements such a policy:

Strictly, the adkim=, aspf=, ri= and pct= are not necessary since their defaults are used. However, explicit use of defaults is good defensive configuration policy, and can prevent catastrophic errors in the event that a default is subsequently changed. The use of an out-of-zone email address requires an additional change in the report receivers zone file (example.com in this case) to authorize the reports from the example.net organizational name (see rua/ruf parameters. Example 2: Single Domain Name using DKIM and SPF – Timid

This is a timid (or cautious if you prefer) policy where the sender is discovering the real pathology of their mail service and is unsure (or has no idea) if either DKIM and SPF are correctly configured. Assume the domain example.net only sends mail in the gas examples form user@example.net (mail is not sent from any subdomain) and that both DKIM and SPF are used in relaxed format. The domain owner wishes to have a daily aggregate report from mail receivers (in Abuse Report format – RFC 5965) of any problems at the address dmarc-admin@example.net if either SPF or DKIM fails, does not want the receiver to reject any failing mail and suggests that only 10% of mail should be checked. The following addition to example.net’s zone file implements such a policy:

This is an aggressive policy and should only be adopted where the sender is certain that SPF is correctly configured. Assume the domain example.net only sends mail in the form user@example.net (mail is not sent from any subdomain) and that only SPF is used in relaxed format. The domain owner wishes to have a daily aggregate report from mail receivers (in Abuse Report format – RFC 5965) of any problems at the address dmarc-admin@example.net if SPF checks fail, suggests that all mail failing the SPF checks should be rejected and that 100% of mail should be checked. The following addition to example.net gas jeans usa’s zone file implements such a policy:

Strictly, the aspf=, ri= and pct= are not necessary since their defaults are used. However, explicit use of defaults is good defensive configuration policy. It is the presence or absence of either DKIM headers or an SPF RR tested when the mail arrives at the receiver that determine which mail security method is in use rather than the configuration of the DMARC RR. In this case we have eliminated the adkim= to make the actual policy explicit and, since only SPF is in operation, fo=0. The same functional result would have ocurred if adkim=r had been retained and fo=1 as in Example 1 above. If only DKIM was being used adkim=r would have been added and aspf=r removed – but again the previous comment also applies – it is the received mail that determines which checks are invoked not the DMARC RR. Example 4: No mail

This is a supreme act of good neighborliness. Assume the domain never gas prices in michigan sends email. The presence of a DMARC is good practice since mail could be forged with the domain’s name. There is, however, no way to explictly configure a DMARC RR to indicate that mail will never be sent from this domain. Again, this emphasizes the point that DMARC processing is only invoked once the incoming mail protection mechanisms have been discovered. To indicate that a domain will never send mail must be done with a DMARC RR AND a dummy SPF TXT RR as shown: