M1 abram in battle vs soviet tanks page 7 alternate history discussion power company near me

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Click to expand…The Soviets did indeed rely in having an abundence of reseve formations. The had "A", "B", and "C" divisions. The "A" were active forces with the best gear, the "B" was both active formations along lower threat axis (aka The ‘Stans) and in parts of the Pact along with recent reservists (akin to U.S. National Guard who had recently mustered out) and "C" formations with, well, crap. The Soviet system put virtually everyone except certain VIPs through a two year (three for those selected to be NCOs and those in the Navy) conscript training that was brutal in the extreme and designed to impart lifetime skill basics. There were then semi-regular reserve trainings for discharged trops that grew more infrequent as you got older, but you were expected to serve into your 50’s IIRC.

The system was actually fairly clever in one way. The troops who were older continued to be equipped with the same gear as they had used as recruits and active duty troops so the learning curve was mostly flattened when it came to equipment and it also ensured that the least valuable troops got the worst gear. Since Soviet tactics at the platoon level consisted mainly of following every order without question even training in tactical movement was pretty simple.

The weakness, as you have noted, was in getting the reserve formations to show up and have them be even minimally useful in a country with alcholism rates that approached unity and where the average male died in his early 50s & in worse physical shape than most Western men one or even two decades older. Between the almost universal horrific memories of their time in the service, physical condition, and normal fear regarding leaving families it made the mobilization system more than a bit questionable. Balancing that was the legitimate patriotism of the average Soviet about the Motherland and the well earned reputation of the KGB in ensuring compliance with the dictates of the State.

The Soviets did indeed rely in having an abundence of reseve formations. The had "A", "B", and "C" divisions. The "A" were active forces with the best gear, the "B" was both active formations along lower threat axis (aka The ‘Stans) and in parts of the Pact along with recent reservists (akin to U.S. National Guard who had recently mustered out) and "C" formations with, well, crap. The Soviet system put virtually everyone except certain VIPs through a two year (three for those selected to be NCOs and those in the Navy) conscript training that was brutal in the extreme and designed to impart lifetime skill basics. There were then semi-regular reserve trainings for discharged trops that grew more infrequent as you got older, but you were expected to serve into your 50’s IIRC.

The system was actually fairly clever in one way. The troops who were older continued to be equipped with the same gear as they had used as recruits and active duty troops so the learning curve was mostly flattened when it came to equipment and it also ensured that the least valuable troops got the worst gear. Since Soviet tactics at the platoon level consisted mainly of following every order without question even training in tactical movement was pretty simple.

The weakness, as you have noted, was in getting the reserve formations to show up and have them be even minimally useful in a country with alcholism rates that approached unity and where the average male died in his early 50s & in worse physical shape than most Western men one or even two decades older. Between the almost universal horrific memories of their time in the service, physical condition, and normal fear regarding leaving families it made the mobilization system more than a bit questionable. Balancing that was the legitimate patriotism of the average Soviet about the Motherland and the well earned reputation of the KGB in ensuring compliance with the dictates of the State.

Speaking at a conference on “The Future of Armoured Warfare” in London on the 30th May, IDR’s Pentagon correspondent Leland Ness explained that US Army tests involving firing trials on 25 T-72A1 and 12 T-72B1 tanks (each fitted with Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour [ERA]) had confirmed NATO tests done on other former Soviet tanks left behind in Germany after the end of the Cold War. The tests showed that the ERA and composite Armour of the T-72s was incredibly resilient to 1980s NATO anti-tank weapons.

In contrast to the original, or ‘light’, type of ERA which is effective only against shaped charge jets, the ‘heavy’ Kontakt-5 ERA is also effective against the long-rod penetrators of APFSDS tank gun projectiles, anti-tank missiles, and anti-armour rotary cannons. Explosive reactive armour was valued by the Soviet Union and its now-independent component states since the 1970s, and almost every tank in the eastern-European military inventory today has either been manufactured to use ERA or had ERA tiles added to it, including even the T-55 and T-62 tanks built forty to fifty years ago, but still used today by reserve units.